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Abstract
Categories have at least two main functions: classification of instances and feature inference. Classification involves assigning an
instance to a category, and feature inference involves predicting a feature for a category instance. Correspondingly, categories can
be learned in two distinct ways, by classification and feature inference. A typical difference between these in the perceptual
category learning paradigm is the presence of the category label as part of the stimulus in feature inference learning and not in
classification learning. So we hypothesized a label-induced rule-bias in feature inference learning compared to classification and
evaluated it on an important starting point in the field for category learning – the category structures from Shepard, Hovland, and
Jenkins (Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 75(13), 1-42, 1961). They classically found that classification
learning of structures consistent with more complex rules resulted in poorer learning. We compared feature inference learning
of these structures with classification learning and found differences between the learning tasks supporting the label-bias
hypothesis in terms of an emphasis on label-based rules in feature inference. Importantly, participants’ self-reported rules were
largely consistent with their task performance and indicated the preponderance of rule representation in both tasks. So, while the
results do not support a difference in the kind of representation for the two learning tasks, the presence of category labels in
feature inference tended to focus rule formation. The results also highlight the specialized nature of the classic Shepard et al.
(1961) stimuli in terms of being especially conducive to the formation of compact verbal rules.
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Introduction
Making feature inferences about instances of categories is a
crucial cognitive ability in daily life. When presented with a
novel instance from a known category, people can infer its
properties and interact with it. For example, correctly catego-
rizing an apple allows the inference of edibility.
There are at least two ways to learn about categories via
feedback: One is by classification learning, assigning an in-
stance to a category and then being told the correct category,
for example, classifying a small, furry animal as a cat, not a
dog. Another is by feature inference learning, inferring
features of known category instances and being told the cor-
rect feature, for example, inferring a cat is likely to purr if you
pet it (rather than bite). A key difference between these two
learning tasks is the presence of the category membership
information as essentially part of the stimulus in feature infer-
ence. In perceptual category learning, this category informa-
tion commonly takes the form of a category label. This differ-
ence in available information suggests the possibility that clas-
sification and feature inference learning result in fundamen-
tally different category representations and decision making
because of the presence of the label in feature inference.
Consistent with this, Yamauchi and Markman (1998) hy-
pothesized that feature inference learning tasks encourage
learning the internal structure of each category and the typi-
cality of individual features within a category, which induces
prototype representation. Classification learning, in contrast,
encourages learning the differences between categories.
Anderson, Ross, and Chin-Parker (2002) further supported
Yamauchi and Markman’s hypothesis: Participants who had
completed a feature-inference learning task performed better
on single feature classifications than full instance
* Emma L. Morgan
morganel1@cardiff.ac.uk
Mark K. Johansen
JohansenM@cardiff.ac.uk
1 School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Tower Building, Park
Place, Cardiff, Wales CF10 3AS, UK
Memory & Cognition
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-020-01022-8
classifications. This suggests that feature inference encourages
the learning of prototypical features and thus prototype
representation. Johansen and Kruschke (2005) also contrasted
these kinds of learning on the “5-4” category structure from
Medin and Schaffer (1978) and argued that feature inference
encouraged the formation of a set of label-based rules that
sometimes mimicked prototypes and sometimes didn’t.
From this they suggested that feature inference learning does
not induce a prototype representation per se but rather a ten-
dency to form a representation based on the category labels, in
contrast to classification learning.
Similar to learning, decision making for classification ver-
sus feature inference has been argued to be different, with
feature inference especially influenced by category member-
ship information. Gelman and Markman (1986) showed that
feature inference decision making for real-world categories
(e.g., birds) was more heavily influenced by category mem-
bership than by perceptual similarity. Correspondingly, in the
perceptual category learning paradigm, Yamauchi and
Markman (2000) found that feature inferences weremore like-
ly to be determined by a category label than by perceptual
similarity. From this they argued for the special status of the
category labels. This was replicated by Johansen, Savage,
Fouquet, and Shanks (2015), but they argued that the effect
was due to the perceptual salience of the category labels.
Nevertheless, both of these suggest that the presence of the
label in feature inference plausibly induces a difference in
focus compared to classification.
Adapting the hypotheses from Yamauchi and Markman
(1998, 2000) in light of Johansen and Kruschke (2005) and
Johansen et al. (2015), we propose a label-induced rule-bias
hypothesis: Category labels in feature inference bias partici-
pants to use the labels to try to form rules. In contrast,
classification learning does not result in such a bias due to
the lack of the category labels as part of the stimuli. Note that
in contrast to the prior hypotheses, this is not a hypothesis
about what representation participants definitely use but rather
a bias for trying to use a representation based on the labels as
elaborated below.
The purpose of this research was to go back to an important
starting point for category learning – Shepard, Hovland, and
Jenkins (1961) – and to re-evaluate these classic category
structures in terms of feature inference learning to test the
label-bias hypothesis. The conceptual reason these category
structures are important is that they represent an evaluation of
the learnability of what are among the simplest, non-trivial
categories. Specifically, Shepard et al. evaluated the relative
learnability of all possible category structures formed with
eight instances, equally split into two categories, with in-
stances composed of features from three binary-valued dimen-
sions. There are six basic category structure types that are
consistent with these constraints (see Fig. 1). In the figure,
each type is a cube with the specific instances of the A and
B categories at the corners of the cube and the edges indicating
the three feature dimensions and thus the features composing
each instance. The Type I structure can be learned using a rule
on a single dimension, dimension one, that allows one feature
to be exclusively associated with one category and the other
feature to be exclusively associated with the other category,
for example, the feature “square”-shaped only occurs in in-
stances of category A, and the feature “triangle”-shaped in
category B. The Type II structure, XOR, can be learned using
a rule based on the configuration of the first two dimensions,
for example, instances with features “white” and “square” or
“black” and “triangle” are occurrences of category A while
“black” and “square” or “white” and “triangle,” category B.
Fig. 1 The six types of category structures from Shepard et al. (1961).
The diagram in the bottom right shows the assignment of the three stim-
ulus dimensions to each dimension of the abstract category structures, i.e.,
the cubes. Each corner of a cube represents a category instance as
composed of a feature value from each of the three binary-valued stimu-
lus dimensions. “A” labels indicate instances of one category and “B”
labels indicate instances of the other category (adapted in part from
Kruschke, 1992, and Shepard et al., 1961)
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For Types III, IV, and V, learning a rule on the first dimension
allows correct categorization of six out of the eight instances,
but the remaining two exceptions have to be handled in some
other way, for example, for Type V, category A instances are
either “square” or “large” “black” and “triangle” and category
B either “triangle” or “large” “black” and “square.” Finally,
for Type VI, each category instance can be memorized, or the
structure learned in terms of the Odd-Even rule. The Odd-
Even rule requires remembering a single instance and if an-
other instance varies from that instance by one feature or all
three features then the correct category is the opposite of the
category for that instance. If the new instance varies by two
features, then the correct category is the same as the remem-
bered instance (Shepard et al., 1961).
Shepard et al.’s (1961) classic findings were systematic
differences in the learning difficulty for these six category
structures: The Type I category structure was the easiest to
learn, Type II was more difficult, Types III, IV, and V were
equally difficult but all harder than Type II, and Type VI was
the most difficult; in summary I<II<III=IV=V<VI. This pat-
tern of learning has been replicated and evaluated many times
(Edmunds&Wills, 2016; Griffiths, Christian, &Kalish, 2008;
Kruschke, 1992; Kurtz, 2007; Love, Medin, & Gureckis,
2004; Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley, & Glauthier,
1994a; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994b; Rehder &
Hoffman, 2005; Smith, Minda, & Washburn, 2004; Žauhar,
Bajšanski, & Domijan, 2016) though some studies have not
clearly differentiated the learning between some specific types
(Kurtz, Levering, Stanton, Romero, & Morris 2013;
Lewandowsky, 2011; Love, 2002; Žauhar, Bajšanski, &
Domijan, 2014). Shepard et al.’s (1961) key conclusion was
that this pattern of learning difficulty reflects the complexity
of the rules that allow accurate performance, and as such these
results clarify the cognitive mechanisms involved with basic
category learning.
Nosofsky et al. (1994a) replicated Shepard et al. (1961)
with similar stimuli and found the same ordering of the
types, and this represents a kind of canonical replication.
However, deviations from the standard type ordering have
been found as a result of initial task instructions and the
specific stimuli used: Nosofsky and Palmeri (1996) com-
pared integral dimension stimuli to the classic separable
dimension stimuli used by Shepard et al. (1961) and found
that Type II was more difficult than Types III and IV and
not significantly different from Type V. Love (2002) eval-
uated these types using incidental unsupervised learning
and found that Type IV was easier than Type II. Kurtz
et al. (2013) evaluated a variety of manipulations and
found that the relationship of Type II to the other types
can be changed in various ways and questioned the univer-
sality of the ordering of Type II in the classic results. Taken
together, these results suggest that though there are various
influences on the exact ordering and differentiation of the
intermediate types, the overarching pattern of Type I being
easiest and Type VI being hardest and the other types being
intermediate is fairly reliable.
Given the conceptual importance of the Shepard et al.
(1961) types and prior research on potential differences be-
tween classification and feature inference learning, the pur-
pose of our research was to compare classification and feature
inference learning of the classic types. Our primary research
question was: Do classification and feature inference learning
result in different patterns of learnability across the types be-
cause of the presence of the category labels in feature infer-
ence? In this context, the label-bias hypothesis predicts that
feature inference learning induces a tendency to form rules
based on the category labels starting with simple unidimen-
sional rules and progressing to more complex rules if required.
This can potentially be observed in terms of advantages for
feature inference over classification learning wherever a label-
based rule allows performance above chance, for example,
unidimensional rules for Types I and V. This is because the
bias corresponds to participants trying to form a label-based
rule first over other feature-based rules and in Types I and V
these rules are diagnostic and semi-diagnostic, respectively. In
classification tasks there is no such bias as all stimulus features
are roughly comparable in nature.
Experiment 1
This experiment compared the learnability of a subset of the
classic Shepard et al. (1961) types; specifically Types I, II, V,
and VI by classification and feature inference. Not all the fea-
tures in the category structure types can be unambiguously
learned by feature inference. Consider Type I as shown in
Table 1 for the rocket ship stimuli in Fig. 2: Suppose the par-
ticipant is shown that an instance is a member of the category,
“dreton,” has small wings and a small booster (A11_ in Table 1,
Type I). If asked to infer what the length of the body stripe
should be (A11?), there are two dreton category instances that
have narrow wings and a small booster but one of them has a
long stripe (A111) and the other has a short stripe (A110), so
this feature inference cannot be accurately trained for this type.
However, other feature inferences can be accurately learned, for
example for Type I, knowing that a stimulus is a dreton with a
large booster and a long stripe (A?01) only corresponds to one
instance in the category structure, and thus its wing size can be
unambiguously inferred as narrow (A111). In this experiment
we have used Types I, II, V, and VI because these allow all
feature inferences on a single dimension, dimension one, to be
unambiguously trained. In contrast, Types III and IV cannot be
unambiguously trained by feature inferences on any single di-
mension and consequently have not been evaluated here. So, all
responses were on a single dimension for feature inference
learning like they were in classification learning. It is also worth
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noting the classic finding that Types III, IV, andVare equivalent
in learning difficulty.
The stimuli in this experiment, the rocket ships in Fig. 2,
were used in preference to the classic color/shape/size stimuli
in Shepard et al. (1961) because those stimuli don’t allow
feature removability, i.e., for individual features to be removed
but the stimulus to still be presented. For example, you cannot
remove the shape dimension from a “large black triangle” as
the coloring of the instance remains and needs to have a shape.
In contrast, the rocket ship stimuli can be presented with indi-
vidual features removed so that those features can be queried
in terms of feature inference.
Materials and methods
Participants
One hundred and twenty Cardiff University students participat-
ed for either course credit or payment. Thirty participants were
trained on each of the category structure types (Table 1) with 15
in each learning condition, classification, or feature inference.
Materials and procedure
The abstract category structures corresponding to the four
types – I, II, V, and VI – and the specification of all training
and testing trials, by type, are shown in Table 1. Each category
structure type has four instances in two categories, the top of
Table 1. Each instance is composed of a category label, either
A or B, and three binary-valued feature dimensions. Each
column indicates one feature dimension with two feature
values. Bold features and question marks indicate the feature
that was queried on a trial. For example, the classification
condition training item A111 indicates that the category label
Table 1 Abstract category structures for each of the two learning
conditions (classification and feature inference) and the four category
structure Types (I, II, V, and VI) used in Experiment 1, training phase
trials at the top and testing phase trials at the bottom
Type I Type II Type V Type VI
Classification Training Phase
A 111 A 111 A 111 A 111
A 101 A 110 A 110 A 010
A 110 A 001 A 101 A 001
A 100 A 000 A 000 A 100
B 011 B 011 B 011 B 011
B 001 B 010 B 001 B 110
B 010 B 101 B 010 B 101
B 000 B 100 B 100 B 000
Feature Inference Training Phase
A 111 A 111 A 111 A 111
A 101 A 110 A 110 A 010
A 110 A 001 A 101 A 001
A 100 A 000 A 000 A 100
B 011 B 011 B 011 B 011
B 001 B 010 B 001 B 110
B 010 B 101 B 010 B 101
B 000 B 100 B 100 B 000
Testing Phase
A 111 A 111 A 111 A 111
A 101 A 110 A 110 A 010
A 110 A 001 A 101 A 001
A 100 A 000 A 000 A 100
B 011 B 011 B 011 B 011
B 001 B 010 B 001 B 110
B 010 B 101 B 010 B 101
B 000 B 100 B 100 B 000
A 111 A 111 A 111 A 111
A 101 A 110 A 110 A 010
A 110 A 001 A 101 A 001
A 100 A 000 A 000 A 100
B 011 B 011 B 011 B 011
B 001 B 010 B 001 B 110
B 010 B 101 B 010 B 101
B 000 B 100 B 100 B 000
A 1?1 A 111 A 110 A 111
A 1?0 A 000 A 000 A 100
B 0?1 B 010 B 010 B 110
B 0?0 B 101 B 100 B 101
A 11? A 11? A 101 A 010
A 10? A 00? A 000 A 001
B 01? B 01? B 001 B 011
B 00? B 10? B 100 B 000
Note. “A” and “B” refer to the two category labels and the subsequent
three numbers refer to the three binary-valued feature dimensions and the
feature values on those dimensions. Bolded features and question marks
indicate what was queried for a given instance in a given condition. Bold
features represent a correct answer and questionmarks indicate the lack of
an unambiguous correct answer
Fig. 2 Set of eight rocket ship stimuli used in Experiment 1 composed of
features from three dimensions – wing width, stripe length, and booster
size
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was queried and the feature inference training item A111 in-
dicates that the first perceptual feature dimension was queried.
In the learning phase instances, bold features indicate the cor-
rect answer. The question marks on testing trials indicate that
there was no unambiguous correct answer. Testing trials, at the
bottom of Table 1, omitted feedback and included all classifi-
cation and feature inference training items from both training
conditions; a given participant was only trained on classifica-
tion or feature inference but was tested on both in the testing
phase. Testing also included a selection of feature inferences
on the second and third dimensions as shown at the bottom of
the table.
The eight rocket ship stimuli used (Fig. 2) corresponded to
the eight instances in each category structure type (Table 1).
The rocket ships had features on three dimensions: wing width
(wide or narrow), stripe length (long or short), and booster size
(large or small). The two categories of rocket ship were la-
belled “dreton” and “rilbar.” The assignment of physical fea-
tures (Fig. 2) to abstract category features (Table 1) was ran-
domized across participants.
Stimuli were presented using DirectRT. Participants com-
pleted 320 training trials consisting of the eight category in-
stances in random order within a block for 40 blocks of train-
ing. Subsequent to training, participants were tested without
feedback on a block of the classification training instances,
followed by a block of the feature inference training instances
and, finally, a block of the selection of feature inferences on
the second and third dimensions. The order of the testing trials
was randomized within each block.
In the training phase, after each classification training re-
sponse, feedback contained the full stimulus, the words, “cor-
rect” or “incorrect” followed by “This is a dreton” or “This is a
rilbar” depending on the correct answer. After each feature
inference training trial there was feedback that contained the
full stimulus, the words “correct” or “incorrect” followed by
“The correct answer is shown above.”
Participants were given a cover story that they were visiting
an alien solar system and needed to learn about the different
types of rocket ships used by the aliens. They were told that
they were going to be shown rocket ships and would need to
make a choice between two responses. In the classification
conditions, they were told that the category labels would be
their response options, and in the feature inference conditions,
they were told that two features would be their response op-
tions. They were made aware that they would have to guess
initially but that they could learn the correct responses with
practice. They then completed the learning phase followed by
the testing phase.
Design
This was a between-subjects design with eight conditions:
four structure types (Types I, II, V, and VI in Table 1) learned
by either classification or feature inference. The key depen-
dent variable was accuracy by block for each condition. We
also report the proportion of participants whose performance
was greater than a learning criterion as an alternative measure
of learning.
Analysis
Analysis included standard parametric statistics as well as
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for most results. The
confidence intervals were used to relax the normality
assumption.
Results
Asymptotic learning was fairly poor for all conditions except
Type I as shown by the proportions of participants who
reached a learning criterion of greater than 75% correct in
the last four blocks of training (Fig. 3). Despite 40 blocks of
training, only two (out of 15) participants achieved the crite-
rion in Type VI feature inference. Learning in this experiment
was substantially worse than a prior standard replication
(Nosofsky et al., 1994a; see Fig. 4) that is, the average pro-
portion correct in the last 16 trials of classification training
was worse for Type II in this experiment than in Nosofsky
et al. (t(14)=3.9, p=0.002, effect size as Cohen’s d=3.7;
bootstrapping gave a 95% bias corrected confidence interval
of (0.1, 0.4) and p=0.006). Proportion correct was also worse
for Type V (t(14)=4.7, p<0.001, d=1.6; bootstrapped confi-
dence interval (0.2, 0.4) and p=0.001) and for Type VI
(t(18)=6.2, p<0.001, d=2.9; bootstrapped confidence interval
(0.3, 0.5) and p<0.001). Despite this there is evidence that
some learning occurred in all conditions as performance is
significantly above chance for Type II (t(14)=4.0, p=0.001,
d=0.996; bootstrapped confidence interval (0.1, 0.4) and
p=0.005) and Type V (t(14)=3.0, p=0.009, d=1.10;
Fig. 3 Proportion of the n = 15 participants in each learning condition and
type from Experiment 1 who achieved the learning criterion (greater
than 75% accuracy in the final four training blocks)
Mem Cogn
bootstrapped confidence interval (0.1, 0.3)) and there is a mar-
ginal difference in the right direction for Type VI (t(14)=1.5,
p=0.14, d=0.065; bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.02,
0.2)). Note that the degrees of freedom for some of the prior
and subsequent t-tests are adjusted degrees of freedom in the
context of assuming unequal variances.
For the classification learning task (see Fig. 5, left panel)
average accuracy over all learning blocks was higher for Type
I than the next most accurate type, Type V (t(19)=5.5,
p<0.001, d=2.02; bootstrapped confidence interval (0.2, 0.3)
and p=0.001). There was no significant difference between
Types Vand II (t(28)=0.7, p=0.50, d=0.25; bootstrapped con-
fidence interval (-0.2, 0.1) and p=0.50), but average accuracy
was significantly higher for Type II than Type VI (t(15)=2.7,
p=0.016, d=0.996; bootstrapped confidence interval (0.04,
0.2) and p=0.022). Overall, the results of classification learn-
ing replicate the classic difficulty ordering, though Types II
and V were not clearly differentiated.
For the feature inference learning task (Fig. 5, right panel),
average accuracy was significantly higher for Type I than
Type V (t(21)=12.0, p<0.001, d=4.39; bootstrapped confi-
dence interval (0.3, 0.4) and p<0.001). Type V was not signif-
icantly different from Type II (t(20)=1.0, p=0.34, d=0.36;
bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.1, 0.1) and p=0.34) nor
was Type II significantly different from Type VI (t(21)=1.5,
p=0.14, d=0.56; bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.02, 0.2)
and p=0.15). Thus, feature inference learning only clearly rep-
licated the classic finding in terms of Type I being the easiest
with poor differentiation of Types II, V, and VI.
Direct comparison of classification and feature inference
learning by type shows that there were significantly higher
accuracies for Type I feature inference than for Type I classi-
fication in the first two blocks of learning (t(25)=3.4, p=0.002,
d=1.24; bootstrapped confidence interval (0.1, 0.4) and
p=0.007). This superior performance in feature inference sup-
ports the label-bias hypothesis that feature inference learning
induces a bias to evaluate the label-based unidimensional rule
and classification does not as the label was not present. The
average accuracies for classification and feature inference
learning across all learning blocks were not significantly dif-
ferent for Type II (t(28)=0.3, p=0.74, d=0.12; bootstrapped
confidence interval (-0.1, 0.1) and p=0.74), for Type V
(t(21)=0.3, p=0.80, d=0.096; bootstrapped confidence interval
(-0.1, 0.1) and p=0.79) or for Type VI (t(28)=0.9, p=0.36,
d=0.33; bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.1, 0.02) and
p=0.37).
As a way of visualizing learning at the level of individual
participants, the learning error diagrams in Fig. 6 show
responding on each learning trial for every participant ar-
ranged by learning type and condition: Each participant’s
responding is shown within a gray rectangle outline, within
this outline a trial is a single dot, and black dots indicate
response errors. Each column of dots is the response accuracy
for each training item in a block in standardized order, as in
Table 1, and each row of dots in a rectangle represents the
accuracy for a given training item across all 40 training blocks.
Finally, participants in each condition have been arranged
roughly by their learning performance, good learners toward
the top and poor learners toward the bottom.
A key benefit of error diagrams is to be able to spot patterns
in errors at the level of individual participants. Amongst these,
perseverative suboptimal rule use can be seen (Fig. 6) as sys-
tematic errors on particular instances, i.e., as horizonal black
Fig. 5 Averaged accuracy in terms of proportion correct across groups of
two training blocks by Type (I, II, V, andVI) and learning condition (CL =
Classification, FI = Feature Inference) in Experiment 1. Classification
learning is displayed on the left, and feature inference learning on the
right. Error bars are standard error
Fig. 4 Accuracy in terms of proportion correct averaged in the final
learning phase block by type for Experiment 1 classification, colored
bars, and data from Nosofsky et al. (1994a), gray bars. Error bars are
standard error
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lines. Such suboptimal rule use is most apparent for Type V
feature inference where a label-based rule allowed 75% accu-
racy at the cost of consistent errors on the fourth and eighth
instances in Table 1. Participants were operationally defined
as using this suboptimal rule if their respondingwas consistent
with this error pattern for over 15 blocks out of 40 (with a
maximum allowed deviation from the pattern of one response
per block). Approximately half of the participants in the Type
V feature inference learning condition showed this pattern of
responding, significantly more than in classification learning
(p = 0.018, Fisher’s exact test). Crucially, this occurred despite
the existence of a corresponding suboptimal rule based on a
single feature dimension also being available in classification
learning. This suggests perseveration with a label-based rule
that supports the label-bias hypothesis.
Finally, the error diagrams show rapid transitions from
chance performance to high accuracy, seen as a change from
the left (noise) to the right (white) of an individual panel.
These rapid transitions are consistent with rule acquisition as
finding a rule that gives optimal performance allows for rapid
performance improvement.
Discussion
The results of this experiment support the label-induced rule-
bias hypothesis that the category labels in feature inference
learning bias participants to try to form label-based rules.
This hypothesis is supported by a feature inference learning
advantage for Type I, the presence of significantly more sub-
optimal rule use for Type V feature inference compared to
Type V classification and the similarity in the learning curves
for Types II, V, and VI feature inference.
In more detail, the label-bias for Type I manifests as fol-
lows: In classification learning three unidimensional rules are
all roughly equivalent, one for each feature dimension, with
no clear basis for an initial preference between them, whereas
inference has a single label-based unidimensional rule that is
distinct from the other feature-based rules.We argue that these
differences arise out of a tendency to start with the label-based
rule in feature inference, and therefore participants achieved
perfect performance more rapidly in Type I. For Type I clas-
sification, learning occurred more slowly due to the lack of a
clear basis for a preference between the three unidimensional
rules. Some participants took longer than others, and this
greater variability resulted in classification participants, on
average, taking longer to find the correct rule; they achieved
perfect accuracy more slowly.
Further support for the label-bias hypothesis comes from
the perseveration of suboptimal rule use in Type V feature
inference. A possible reason for this perseveration is in terms
of difficulty as the relatively poor performance on the task
overall compared to Nosofsky et al. (1994a) and the interac-
tion of this with the difference between classification and fea-
ture inference: The suboptimal label-based rule is easier to
find in feature inference due to the bias and gives accurate
enough performance to encourage participants to keep using
the rule given the task difficulty.
Finally, the greater similarity of the learning curves for Types
II, V, and VI feature inference (Fig. 5) supports the label-bias as
the bias is consistent with attempts to form label-based rules in
feature inference conditions in contrast to classification. In Type
I this leads to accurate performance early on in learning as is
observed as the label-based rule is accurate. However, a bias for
simple unidimensional rules for the harder types, does not allow
optimal performance. In addition, even with the label-bias,
Fig. 6 Panels showing the individual performance of each participant in
Experiment 1 on every learning trial. White dots indicate a correct answer
on an individual trial and black dots indicate an incorrect answer. Each
row represents a single category instance, and the instances are ordered as
in Table 1. Therefore, each rowwithin a panel shows performance on one
specific trial across the 40 learning blocks. Each column of panels
represents a learning condition as indicated by the column headers
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there are still multiple nonoptimal rules for the higher types
involving the labels. So, a label-bias for the higher types is less
helpful for performance and may actually be harmful, manifest-
ing in similar, relatively poor learning across the types.
The label-bias hypothesis could be taken to imply that fea-
ture inference induces rule representation and that classifica-
tion does not. However, the error diagrams suggest rapid tran-
sitions from chance performance to near perfect performance
consistent with the use of rules in both classification and fea-
ture inference learning tasks for people who learned. The key
difference is in terms of the bias on rule formation in feature
inference rather than a wholly different class of representation
such as exemplars.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of these results is the
poorer learning of the classification conditions compared to
Nosofsky et al. (1994a): It is clear some learning occurred in
all conditions, just not as much (see Fig. 4). Methodologically,
the classification learning conditions here were similar to stan-
dard replications with the key exception of the stimuli.
The current rocket ship stimuli are not unusual for the per-
ceptual categorization paradigm where many prior studies
have used rocket ships (see Hoffman & Ziessler, 1983;
Johansen et al., 2015; Palmeri, 1999; etc.). Also, different
features were not visually hard to discriminate (see Fig. 2).
Kurtz et al. (2013) argued that the verbal nameability of the
feature values, the ease with which a feature can be given a
verbal descriptor, influenced learnability; the nameability of
Types II and IV impacts how well they are learned and can
reverse the typical ordering for these types. The implication of
nameability is in terms of the implied interaction with the
formation of verbal rules and their memorability. Minda,
Desroches, and Church (2008) found that when a naming task
is given to children prior to learning Type II, this improves
performance. To improve the learning in the classification
conditions to be more consistent with prior replications, we
adjusted the verbalizability of the stimuli in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
To improve the nameability of the features on each dimension
and reduce interference/confusability between dimensions,
Experiment 2 changed the dimensions so that they were color,
shape, and size, as in the Shepard et al. (1961) stimuli, but
applied to the rocket ship features, and the category labels were
changed from two syllables to one syllable. In combination,
these changes were intended to facilitate learning via more com-
pact verbal rules. Importantly, rule use was assessed by asking
participants to report what they saw and how they responded
using qualitative questions at the end of the experiment. Finally,
the feature inference feedback was amended slightly to include
the category label, and the testing phase for both learning tasks
was updated to include all possible feature inferences.
Materials and methods
Participants
Four hundred and sixteen Cardiff University students partici-
pated for either course credit or payment. Each of the eight
combinations of type (Types I, II, V, and VI) and learning
condition (classification or feature inference) had 52
participants.
Materials and procedure
The eight new rocket ship stimuli were composed of three
feature dimensions: stripe color (blue or green), cone shape
(pointed or rounded), andwings size (wide or narrow) as shown
in Fig. 7. The category labels were changed to “thab” and
“lork”. The feature inference feedback was adjusted to include
the same information as the classification feedback such that it
included the label presented under the stimuli as well as the
feedback, “correct” or “incorrect” and a note that the correct
answer was shown at the top of the screen. The testing phase
included all the original classification and feature inference
items in Experiment 1, but feature inference trials were added
to include all possible feature inferences on the training items
(see Appendix 1). Also, at the end of the experiment, partici-
pants were given the following questions: “Did you find a rule
to help you learn the task? If so, please describe it briefly.”
Followed by: “If you did not learn a rule what did you use/
learn to help you do the task?”All other methodological details
of this experiment were the same as Experiment 1.
Fig. 7 Rocket ship stimuli used in Experiment 2, composed of features on
three stimulus dimensions: blue/green stripe, pointed/rounded cone, and
wide/narrow wings
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Results
The updated stimuli improved learning in all of the types (see
Fig. 8) with significant differences for Type I (t(33)=3.0,
p=0.006, d=0.62; bootstrapped confidence interval (0.01,
0.06) and p=0.019), Type II (t(132)=3.4, p=0.001, d=0.71;
bootstrapped confidence interval (0.1, 0.2) and p=0.001) and
Type VI (t(117)=4.1, p<0.001, d=0.85; bootstrapped confi-
dence interval (0.04, 0.1) and p<0.001), and a marginally sig-
nificant improvement in Type V (t(61)=1.8, p=0.08, d=0.37;
bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.1, 0.005) and p=0.08.
Note, some degrees of freedom are adjusted from assuming
unequal variances). Overall, these results are consistent with
more compact and less confusable verbal rules facilitating
learning by being somewhat easier to use.
For average accuracy across all learning blocks in classifi-
cation learning (Fig. 9 left side) accuracy was significantly
higher for Type I than the next closest type, Type II
(t(54)=9.1, p<0.001, d=1.79; bootstrapped confidence interval
(0.2, 0.3) and p<0.001). There was no significant difference
between Types II and V (t(102)=1.3, p=0.21, d=0.26;
bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.02, 0.1) and p=0.21)
and Type V was significantly higher than Type VI
(t(102)=5.0, p<0.001, d=0.98; bootstrapped confidence inter-
val (0.09, 0.2) and p<0.001). Thus, the results of classification
learning replicate the classic difficulty ordering, though Types
II and V were again not clearly differentiated.
For average accuracy across all learning blocks in feature
inference (Fig. 9 right side), Type I was significantly higher
than Type II (t(53)=8.2, p<0.001, d=1.61; bootstrapped con-
fidence interval (0.2, 0.3) and p<0.001) and there was no
significant difference between Types II and V (t(99)=1.2,
p=0.22, d=0.24; bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.03,
0.1) and p=0.23) but there was a marginally significant differ-
ence between Types V and VI (t(102)=1.8, p=0.07, d=0.35;
bootstrapped confidence interval (-0.005, 0.1) and p=0.07).
Thus, feature inference learning replicated the general order-
ing in Experiment 1 with Type I being the easiest.
Direct comparison of classification and feature inference
learning by type shows that Type I feature inference had
higher accuracy than classification across the first two learn-
ing blocks (t(88)=2.8, p=0.007, d=0.55; bootstrapped confi-
dence interval (0.03, 0.2) and p=0.008). This replicates
Experiment 1 and supports the label-bias hypothesis. It is
worth noting that a significant difference occurred despite
the improvement in performance from the updated stimuli
raising performance towards ceiling. Further, Type II feature
inference had higher accuracy than classification across the
first two learning blocks (t(92)=2.2, p=0.028, d= 0.43,
bootstrapped confidence interval (0.007, 0.1)). Additionally,
feature inference had higher accuracy than classification for
Type VI when averaged across all blocks of learning
(t(96)=2.6, p=0.012, d=0.51; bootstrapped confidence interval
(0.02, 0.1) and p=0.012). Finally, there was no significant
difference in accuracy across all learning blocks in the Type
V conditions (t(102)=0.02, p=0.98, d=0.004; bootstrapped
confidence interval (-0.06, 0.06) and p=0.98). So, Types I,
II, and VI indicate differences between classification and
Fig. 8 Comparison of accuracy as average proportion correct by type across groups of two training blocks between Experiments 1, dark lines, and 2,
light lines. Error bars are standard error
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feature inference learning and support the label-bias hypothe-
sis, but Type V does not, possibly due to easier stimuli reduc-
ing the use of suboptimal dimensional rules.
The difference between classification and feature inference
(Fig. 9) is further supported by the marginally significant in-
teraction between learning conditions and types for Types V
and VI (F(1,204)=3.38, p=0.067, hp2= 0.016). This interac-
tion is consistent with a difference between classification and
feature inference in terms of poorer differentiation of the learn-
ing conditions in feature inference than in classification.
However, the predominant reason for the poorer differentia-
tion in feature inference is the significantly better performance
for Type VI by feature inference than classification learning.
As in Experiment 1, individual participant error diagrams
(Fig. 10) show rapid transitions from chance performance to
high accuracy (formalized in detail below), consistent with the
sudden acquisition of a rule. There was far less use of subop-
timal rules, especially for Type V relative to the previous ex-
periment, as might be expected from better learning due to the
updated stimuli. As supported by responses to the questions
about learning strategy (discussed below), this is consistent
with more participants finding optimal rules.
At the end of the experiment, participants described how
they learned the task. These qualitative data were used to
assign participants to seven groups in terms of those who used
the optimal rules, suboptimal rules, “no rule”/poor reported
learning, prototypes, a pattern of responding, memorized ex-
emplars, or whose descriptions were ambiguous. The criteria
for coding into these groups is described in Appendix 2.
The proportion of the participants attributed to each strate-
gy for each learning condition (Fig. 11, left panel) shows a
predominance of optimal rule use, 47% (participants marked
by light green patches, Fig. 10) across Types I, II, and V for
participants in the error diagrams, compared to the next most
prevalent strategy. As seen in the error diagrams for Type VI,
the majority of participants did not learn the task. For all types,
participants who reported that they did not learn, the red
patches in Fig. 10, were mostly participants in the error dia-
grams who clearly did not learn anything. When the partici-
pants who did not learn were removed (Fig. 11, right panel),
the proportion of optimal rule users averaged across all types
was even higher, 64%. Despite the complexity of the Odd-
Even rule in Type VI, 21% of the participants who learned the
task made a statement that was clearly consistent with using
this rule. Although there were more participants who reported
exemplar memorization (the blue patches in Fig. 10) for the
harder types, inclusion in this group was based on the lax
requirement of participants’ stating that they were using ex-
emplars rather than a requirement to list all exemplars. In
contrast, the attribution to the rule use group was based on
the harsh requirement not only to specify a rule but a confir-
mation that their rule was accurate given the stimuli they saw.
Overall, the accuracy/believability of participants statements
about their performance and strategy was objectively very
high; when they said they didn’t learn, they hadn’t learned.
When they reported an optimal rule, they had learned, but
when their descriptions were ambiguous or reported memo-
rizing exemplars, they may or may not have learned, and this
was more prevalent for harder types. But Type II had a pre-
ponderance of participants who both reported accurate rules
and learned well.
To quantify the apparent sudden improvements in perfor-
mance observed in the error diagrams (Fig. 10), we used
Boltzmann sigmoid functions fitted using Origin (Pro)
Version 2017 to individual participant learning curves to infer
the interval between initial and final learning performance (see
Appendix 3 for details). To emphasize, this was not directly
fitting a category representation model, for example,
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992), to participants’ data and using
the goodness of those fits to infer the nature of the represen-
tation, for example, exemplar representation. Rather the slope
(the steepness) of the threshold for the fitted sigmoid func-
tions, for example, as in the individual participant learning
curves in Fig. 12 for Type II classification learning, indicates
how suddenly participants improved from initial chance per-
formance to their final level of accuracy; specifically, this is
formalized in terms of the number of learning blocks between
the start and end of performance improvement, i.e. the block
just before where performance clearly started to improve and
the block later in learning where it stopped improving. Short
acquisition intervals, we argue, are evidence of sudden rule
insight whereas long acquisition intervals are indicative of
Fig. 9 Accuracy averaged in terms of proportion correct by type and learning condition with classification learning on the left, and feature inference
learning on the right for Experiment 2. Error bars are standard error
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gradual build-up in associative strengths between categories
and a representation such as exemplars.
The fitted sigmoid functions to the learning curves for each
individual participant in Type II classification (see Fig. 12 and
Appendix 3) show that these functions do a good job of char-
acterizing the rapidness of performance improvement. Most
participants in this condition showed extremely rapid
performance transitions consistent with sudden rule acquisi-
tion, for example, participant 2, but a small number of partic-
ipants learned gradually, consistent with exemplar memoriza-
tion, for example, participant 28.
Average speed of acquisition across conditions by qualita-
tive groupings (Fig. 13) shows that participants who reported
using (optimal) rules learned at least marginally faster on
Fig. 10 Panels show individual performance of each participant in
Experiment 2 on every learning trial. White dots indicate a correct
answer on an individual trial and black dots indicate an incorrect
answer. Each row represents a single category instance, and the
instances are ordered as in Table 1. Therefore, each row within a panel
shows performance on one specific trial across the 40 learning blocks.
Each column of panels represents a learning condition as indicated by the
column headers. Blocks of color to the left of each panel represent the
learning strategy as inferred from the questions at the end of the
experiment (light green = optimal rule, dark green = suboptimal rule,
red = no rule, blue = exemplars, gray = ambiguous, yellow =
prototypes, purple = pattern of responding)
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average over all conditions than those who reported memoriz-
ing exemplars (t(117)=2.0, p=0.043, d=0.39; bootstrapped
confidence interval (0.1, 7.9) and p=0.058) or other strategies
(t(119)=2.3, p=0.02, d=0.38; bootstrapped confidence interval
(0.8, 7.8) and p=0.02). Splitting participants using their sig-
moid slopes into slow learners, slope <= 0.05, and fast
learners, slope > 0.05, shows that only a small proportion,
10% in the top panel of Fig. 14, of people who learned at all
learned slowly in Type II classification, and that the elimina-
tion of this handful of slow participants left participants with a
very short average acquisition interval of 2.2 blocks (Fig. 14,
bottom panel), consistent with rapid rule acquisition. The
Type II feature inference results (see Appendix 4) show a
similar pattern supporting rapid rule acquisition, and both
are consistent with the preponderance of reported rule use in
Type II. For Types V and VI the proportions of participants
who learned slowly by this criterion were substantially larger
(Fig. 14, top panel), consistent with the greater reported use of
exemplar memorization in the qualitative results (Figs. 11 and
10). It is worth noting that Type V was learned even more
Fig. 12 Sigmoid functions fitted to learning curves for participants who showed any learning (in the error diagrams; Fig. 10) in the Type II classification
condition
Fig. 11 Proportion of participants who reported using each kind of
representation for each type and learning condition. The left panel
includes all participants and the right panel is for participants who met
the learning criterion (where the number of participants who learned in
each type and condition can be seen in the error diagrams; Fig. 10)
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slowly than Type VI, possibly because the use of a verbal rule
in Type V still requires the memorization of at least two ex-
ception instances to achieve perfect performance.
As a compliment to the speed of acquisition analysis
supporting rule use, the individual error diagrams specifically
for slow learners (slope <= 0.05 in the last paragraph) show
evidence of exemplar memorization (Fig. 15). In these error
diagrams, evidence of exemplar memorization can be seen as
near perfect learning on a subset of instances but with chance
performance on other instances. Visually this appears in the
error diagrams in Fig. 10 as single long white lines corre-
sponding to good performance and intermixed black and
white dotted lines corresponding to chance performance.
The light blue bars in Fig. 15 correspond to long sequences
of correct answers (at least 13) on some specific category
instances in the presence of chance performance on at least
one other instance (13 in a row correct is very unlikely by
chance). Of the 58 slow learners (Fig. 15), 38 show this pat-
tern clearly. However, it is worth emphasizing this is a con-
servative conclusion in that many of the other individuals
show the pattern more weakly, and a requirement for 13 in a
row correct is a strict criterion. Overall, slow acquisition
seems to have arisen out of having learned some instances
and not others rather than either gradual or sudden acquisition
of all instances.
Participants in both learning conditions were tested on one
block of classification items matching the classification train-
ing condition items and one block of feature inference items
matching the feature inference training condition items, even
though they were only trained on one of these learning tasks.
For participants who met a greater than 75% learning criterion
in the last four learning blocks, the testing trial results (Fig. 16)
showed that decrements in performance between trained and
untrained items were very small. For example, the largest
decrement was only 0.13 in Type VI Classification. This
equates to one participant out of two making slightly more
than one mistake across the eight untrained testing items on
average and shows very little decrement for the untrained
trials, consistent with verbal rule use.
Discussion
Observed differences between classification and feature
inference learning are consistent with the label-bias hy-
pothesis; this hypothesis was most directly supported by
the Type I advantage, better performance for Type I feature
inference over Type I classification early in training con-
sistent with the bias inducing participants to try the correct
rule more quickly. The hypothesis was also supported by
better early learning of Type II in feature inference learning
than in classification. More subtly the bias is supported by
the poor differentiation between Types II, V, and VI in
feature inference learning which is consistent with similar
attempts to use label-based rules in all feature inference
tasks even when these were not optimal rules.
Despite the support for the label-bias hypothesis in terms of
differences between the learning tasks, the even stronger con-
clusion from these results is the substantial evidence for the
use of rules in both learning tasks. This is supported by the
rapid performance transitions in the error diagrams, the high
accuracy on the untrained responses, and the qualitative de-
scriptions of rules that are accurate.
Fig. 14 Proportions of participants who showed rapid versus slow
improvements in task performance by condition in Experiment 2 (top
panel), and average acquisition intervals for fast versus slow
participants by condition (bottom panel). Error bars are standard error
Fig. 13 Average speed of acquisition for participants in Experiment 2,
split by their qualitative grouping (optimal rules = green, exemplars =
blue, other = gray). Error bars are standard error
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In more detail, the testing trial data showed only small
decrements between performance on trained and untrained
classification and feature inference trials. For example, a uni-
dimensional rule in feature inference training might have been
responding with wide wings for a thab and this would make it
easy to do the untrained classification item that involved
responding thab when shown a rocket ship with wide wings.
The verbal rule contains all elements of the stimuli and the
category label, so it does not matter which response is queried.
For the qualitative data what people said they did was quite
closely related to their actual performance. Bearing in mind
that the strategy reported by 29% of all participants was am-
biguous and only a further 6% reported a strategy that was
inconsistent with their performance, the strategy reported by
65% of participants was consistent with their learning perfor-
mance either in terms of saying they learned the task or saying
that they didn’t learn. For example, a participant in the Type
VI classification condition who did not learn the task said,
“No, didn’t find a rule so I guessed each time.” Another par-
ticipant in the Type VI classification condition who did learn
stated, “If only one feature had changed, the top was the op-
posite to the previous rocket. If two changed, it was the same
top as the previous rocket. If three changed, it was again the
opposite.” This is the Odd-Even rule. As it seems strange that
participants could verbalize accurate rules if they were not
using them, these data indicate the dominance of verbal rules
across all conditions. The harder conditions did show a greater
proportion of qualitative results supporting exemplar memo-
rization, but the accuracy of this characterization is less clear
than for rules because participants were not asked to explicitly
report all instances.
Lastly, the learning improved significantly from
Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, arguably due to improvement
of the nameability of the feature dimensions and values used
for the stimuli and the subsequent impact on the ease with
which the features could be used in verbal rules. However, it
is important to note that learning was still poorer than in
Shepard et al. (1961) and without a direct comparison to the
stimuli commonly used in Shepard et al. (1961) replications,
the conclusions in terms of the nameability of the stimuli are
limited due to other methodological differences.
Fig. 15 Error diagrams for participants who learned slowly (sigmoid
slope <=0.05) for Types II, V, and VI. The light blue bars correspond to
sequences of at least 13 blocks in a row correct for specific category
instances in the presence of clearly poor performance on at least one
other instance, i.e., performance at chance
Fig. 16 Average accuracy as proportion correct in the testing phase for
each type, where the results are separated by the nature of the testing trials
(classification or feature inference) and by whether or not the participants
were trained on trials of that kind, all for participants who met a greater
than 75% learning criterion over the last four blocks. Error bars are
standard error
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We argue that Shepard et al.’s (1961) stimuli are specialized
even by the standards of the perceptual learning paradigm in
that their features can be described in a way that allows ex-
tremely compact verbal rules. In the classic stimuli, the noun
descriptor of the object as a whole is treated as one of the
features, for example, for a small, black triangle the name of
the object overall is “triangle”; however, that is also one of the
features. This contrasts with the rocket ship stimuli in which
“rocket ship” is the name of the object but is not a feature
value used to discriminate category instances. Additionally,
Shepard et al.’s stimuli are composed of features that refer to
the instance as a whole and therefore do not require additional
descriptors to discriminate between the feature dimensions.
For example, with the size feature dimension, Shepard
et al.’s stimuli may have the value “big” and that is sufficient
to describe that feature value because it refers to the instance
as a whole. With the rocket ship stimuli, the size dimension
needs an extra descriptor, “big booster” to indicate what is big.
The learning based on Shepard et al.’s stimuli therefore bene-
fits from these advantages that allow rules to be specified very
compactly. Experiment 3 directly compared the classic
Shepard et al. (1961) stimuli to the rocket ship stimuli used
in Experiment 2 in the context of a common methodology.
Experiment 3
The learning in Experiment 2 was not as good as Nosofsky
et al. (1994a), the standard replication of Shepard et al. (1961).
We have argued that this is due to the specialized nature of the
stimuli used in Shepard et al. (1961) and its replications.
Despite both sets of stimuli having the same feature dimen-
sions of color, shape and size from the classic stimuli, the
Shepard et al. stimuli allow especially compact rules, for ex-
ample, “black triangles, white circles group A else group B,”
in contrast to the rocket ship stimuli, for example, “wide
wings, blue stripe rockets and narrow wings, green stripe
rockets thab else lork.”
The purpose of this experiment was to contrast the classic
stimuli with the rocket ship stimuli from Experiment 2 on Type
II classification learning and compare the lengths of the rules
from a qualitative question. We chose Type II as the configural
rule is the simplest, non-trivial rule. We did not include feature
inference learning because the classic stimuli do not facilitate
the feature removability needed for feature inference.
Materials and methods
Participants
Sixty Cardiff University students participated for course credit
or payment.
Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were identical to the Type II
classification learning condition from Experiment 2 for the
rocket ship stimuli condition, except for the removal of the
feature inference testing items at the end. The second condi-
tion used the stimuli of Shepard et al. (1961), which included
category labels (group A and group B) and dimensional var-
iations of shape (triangle/circle), color (black/white), and size
(large/small). Note, the size dimension was scaled to be com-
parable to the overall size of the rocket ship stimuli.
Results
For the early learning blocks (1–2; Fig. 17), learning was
significantly faster for the classic stimuli than the rocket ship
stimuli (t(54)=4.1, p<0.001, d=1.06; bootstrapped confidence
interval (0.1, 0.3) and p<0.001). Individual error diagrams
(Fig. 18) also show this and replicate the rapid transitions from
poor performance to high accuracy, indicative of rule use. And
this is supported by the fits of sigmoid functions to the indi-
vidual participant learning curves for participants who showed
any learning (Fig. 19).
The key rule use query prompted participants to specify
how they learned the task. Importantly, participants’ full de-
scriptions generally used more words than necessary to spec-
ify a rule and included comments not directly about their rule,
for example, one participant stated, “Yes, leaving the mouse
cursor on Group A I would select it if either an unfilled circle
or filled triangle appeared. Otherwise I selected Group B then
reset my cursor on Group A. I focused only on Group A by
using true/false methods to switch and select Group B if nec-
essary. Also, I repeated the words, "unfilled circle, filled tri-
angle" in my head.” From this we inferred the rule, “unfilled
circle, filled triangle, Group A.” Thus, our data tabulation was
in terms of a rule for one category with the other category
implied to be instances that did not satisfy this rule, with
Fig. 17 Accuracy as average proportion correct, averaged over two
learning blocks for both the rocket ship stimuli condition and the classic
stimuli condition. Error bars are standard error
Mem Cogn
additional comments and connectives removed, and only
words which directly described features and category labels
were included. The participants who did not learn were
removed. There were significantly fewer words in the tabulat-
ed configural rules for the classic stimuli compared to the
rocket ship stimuli (Fig. 20) (t(41)=2.4, p=0.021, d=0.74;
bootstrapped confidence interval (0.286, 5.190), p=0.039).
Reported rule use (Fig. 21) was high in both conditions
with 63% of participants reporting an accurate verbal rule in
the rocket ship stimuli condition and, even higher, 83% of
participants reporting an accurate rule in the classic stimuli
condition. And the somewhat higher rule use for the classic
stimuli was consistent with the better learning performance
(Fig. 17).
Discussion
Learning of the classic stimuli was better than the rocket ships,
and the classic stimuli were describedmore compactly in verbal
rules. This implies that the especial rule compactness of the
classic stimuli influences learning performance of the Shepard
et al. (1961) types; compact verbal rules facilitate learning.
General discussion
Learning about categories by feature inference is plausible
given the functional importance of feature inference in cate-
gorization. This research compared classification and feature
inference learning of four of the classic category structures
from Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961; replicated and
evaluated many times; Edmunds & Wills, 2016; Griffiths
et al., 2008; Kruschke, 1992; Kurtz, 2007; Lewandowsky,
2011; Love, 2002; Love et al., 2004; Nosofsky et al., 1994a,
b; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005; Smith et al., 2004; Žauhar et al.,
2016). Our main research question was: Do classification and
feature inference learning result in different patterns of
learnability across the four types (Types I, II, V, and VI) as a
consequence of the presence of the category labels in feature
inference? The observed differences between classification
and feature inference learning suggest that the answer is a
qualified yes in terms of support for the label-bias hypothesis,
i.e., a bias to try to use label-based rules in feature inference
learning in contrast to classification learning. This manifested
most directly in terms of Type I being learned faster by feature
inference than by classification in Experiments 1 and 2 and by
suboptimal rule use in Type V from Experiment 1 where the
stimuli were hard to learn. It also manifested as a similar
feature inference advantage for early Type II learning in
Experiment 2. More subtly, this manifested in terms of less
differentiation of the harder types for feature inference learn-
ing in contrast to the classic type ordering for classification
learning, specifically because Type VI was learned signifi-
cantly more quickly by feature inference than classification.
Despite the support for the bias hypothesis, the results did
not support a distinct kind of representation for classification
Fig. 18 Panels showing the individual performance of each participant in
Experiment 3 on every learning trial. White dots indicate a correct answer
on an individual trial and black dots indicate an incorrect answer. Each
row represents a single category instance, and the instances are ordered as
in Table 1. Therefore, each rowwithin a panel shows performance on one
specific trial across the 40 learning blocks. Each column of panels
represents a learning condition as indicated by the column headers
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versus feature inference learning; the results supported the
preponderance of verbal rule representation for both in con-
trast to the conclusions of prior research (Anderson et al.,
2002; Johansen & Kruschke, 2005; Yamauchi & Markman,
1998; etc.). Notwithstanding skepticism about self-report data,
the qualitative data showed good correspondence between
what participants said about rules, what stimuli they saw and
how well they learned: 64% of participants who learned in the
various conditions of Experiment 2 were able to fully articu-
late accurate verbal rules. In particular, 21% of the participants
who learned Type VI in Experiment 2 explicitly specified the
details of the Odd-Even rule, a complex rule to describe. It is
not clear why participants would be able to specify such ver-
bal rules if this was not how they did the task. Further, the
error diagrams, with all participant errors on individual trials
(Figs. 6, 10, and 18), show relatively rapid changes in perfor-
mance from chance to high accuracy consistent with the sud-
den acquisition of rules for the majority of participants, for-
mally measured using the slopes of sigmoid function fits to the
individual participant learning curves (e.g., Figs. 12 and 19).
The testing phase evaluated training instances from both clas-
sification and feature inference even though participants were
Fig. 19 Sigmoid functions fitted to learning curves for participants who showed any learning (in the error diagrams; Fig. 18) in the classic and rocket ship
stimuli conditions
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only trained on one or the other. Testing trials showed little
difference in accuracy on untrained responses (trials trained in
the alternative learning condition) versus trained responses
consistent with the use of rules, as a rule can be easily reversed
in terms of stimulus and response.
Perhaps the most surprising finding of these experiments is
in terms of learnability and the specialized nature of the
Shepard et al. stimuli. The contrast in performance between
Experiments 1 and 2 supported the preponderance of rule-
based representations; the implied greater difficulty of using
the verbal rules on the stimuli in Experiment 1, despite the
plausibility of the stimuli, corresponded to poorer perfor-
mance but more suboptimal rule use especially for Type V.
Changes to the stimuli to allow more compact verbal rules
corresponded to better learning in Experiment 2, also shown
by less suboptimal rule use in Type V. Experiment 3 directly
compared the classic stimuli to the rocket ship stimuli from
Experiment 2 and confirmed the superior learnability of the
classic stimuli but also emphasized the unusual compactness
of the verbal rules they allow.
Despite the undeniable importance of the Shepard et al.
(1961) structures, the substantial evidence for rule representa-
tion in these tasks does not sit particularly comfortably with the
attributes of real-world categories in that real-world categories
are not widely believed to be represented solely by rules, i.e.,
rules in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This con-
trasts with the evidence for the preponderance of rule-based
category representations in the results presented here. But,
while these results don’t support a difference in the kind of
representation between classification and feature inference
learning (Anderson et al., 2002; Johansen & Kruschke, 2005;
Yamauchi &Markman, 1998; etc.), the label-bias hypothesis is
notably consistent with the spirit of the representational differ-
ence hypothesis from Yamauchi and Markman (1998),
Anderson et al. (2002), etc. and with the importance of category
labels in category based decision making (Gelman &
Markman, 1986; Johansen et al., 2015; Yamauchi &
Markman, 2000; etc.). Feature inference is plausibly less about
the contrast between categories and more focused on the inter-
nal attributes of the category as centered on a conceptual label.
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Appendix 1: All Experiment 2 testing trials
on the second and third stimulus dimensions.
Fig. 20 Average word count for the extraction of the specified optimal
verbal rule for the participants who achieved the learning criterion of
greater than 75% correct over the last four learning blocks. Error bars
are standard error
Fig. 21 Proportion of all participants who reported using each kind of
representation for each learning condition in Experiment 3
Table 2 Additional testing trials for all types in Experiment 2 on the
second and third stimulus dimensions
Testing Trials
Type I Type II Type V Type VI
A1?1 A111 A1?1 A111
A1?1 A110 A110 A010
A1?0 A001 A1?1 A001
A1?0 A000 A000 A100
B0?1 B011 B0?1 B011
B0?1 B010 B0?1 B110
B0?0 B101 B010 B101
B0?0 B100 B100 B000
A11? A11? A11? A111
A10? A11? A11? A110
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Appendix 2: Coding of reported qualitative
strategy results.
Based on responses to the qualitative learning strategy
question at the end of Experiments 2 and 3, participants
were coded into one of seven groups: optimal rules, sub-
optimal rules, no rule/poor reported learning, prototypes, a
pattern of responding, memorized exemplars or ambigu-
ous. The “Optimal rules” group coding used a fairly harsh
criteria of needing to not only fully state a rule but also that
that rule needed to be accurate given the stimulus assign-
ments they actually saw. For Type I the optimal rule was a
first dimension, unidimensional rule, for Type II it was a
configural rule based on the first two dimensions, for Type
V it was a unidimensional rule with two, full instance ex-
ceptions and for Type VI it was the Odd-Even rule.
“Suboptimal rules” were coded as any specification of a
rule that was not the optimal rule for the condition a par-
ticipant was in e.g. a unidimensional rule in Type II.
Participants were coded into the “No rule/poor reported
learning” group if they indicated that they had not been
able to learn the task. The “Exemplars” group was based
on a more relaxed coding in terms of a mention of an
attempt to use an instance memorization strategy or, alter-
natively, a specification of more than two individual in-
stances (so as to distinguish this from optimal rule users
in Type V specifying exceptions). Participants were coded
into the “Ambiguous” group if they were unclear and/or
gave responses that lacked sufficient information. A “pro-
totype” coding required three or more features to be de-
scribed as “mostly” belonging to one category. Finally, a
“pattern of responding” group was coded as a strategy
based on the order of responses across trials rather than
the stimuli, e.g., alternating between category A and B
across a series of trials regardless of the specific stimuli.
Appendix 3: Procedures for fitting Sigmoid
functions to individual learning curves.
We used the graphing and modeling package Origin to fit
Boltzmann sigmoid functions to all individual participant
learning curves in all conditions of Experiments 2 and 3.
The Boltzmann sigmoid, e.g., fitted to participant 8 from clas-
sification learning of Type II in Fig. 22, is specified by
Equation 1. The Boltzmann predicts accuracy, acc, as a func-
tion of learning block, bi, using four parameters: The first is an
initial accuracy parameter for the start of learning before per-
formance started to improve, Iacc, and this was fixed at 0.5,
e.g., Fig. 22. The second was a final accuracy parameter, Facc,
corresponding to the level of performance beyond which no
substantive improvement occurred. This was a free parameter
constrained to be between 0.5 and 1 as not all participants
achieved perfect accuracy (though participant 8 in Fig. 22
was very close). The third parameter was the center of the
threshold part of the function in terms of block, Bmid (treated
as a continuous variable), corresponding to the location of
most rapid improvement in performance and constrained to
be a value between 1 and 40 (as determined by 40 learning
blocks total). And the fourth parameter was the “time constant
parameter,” dx, that is related to the slope of the threshold by
Equation 1b and was constrained to be between 0.25 and 100.
The constraints on the time constant parameter were derived
from specifying the slopes corresponding to the slowest and
fastest possible rates of acquisition over 40 blocks. Origin
adjusted the free parameters within the specified ranges to
minimize the discrepancy between the function’s predicted
accuracy and participants’ actual accuracy over all learning
blocks. Finally, we used a straight line based on the slope
through the midpoint, Equation 1b, to infer the acquisition
Table 2 (continued)
Testing Trials
Type I Type II Type V Type VI
A11? A00? A101 A001
A10? A00? A000 A100
B01? B01? B01? B011
B00? B01? B001 B110
B01? B10? B01? B101
B00? B10? B100 B000
Note. “A” and “B” refer to the two category labels and the subsequent
three numbers refer to the three binary-valued feature dimensions and the
feature values on those dimensions. Bolded features and question marks
indicate what was queried for a given instance in a given condition. Bold
features represent a correct answer and questionmarks indicate the lack of
an unambiguous correct answer
Fig. 22 Boltzmann sigmoid function fit as a bold curve to participant 8’s
learning curve (accuracy by block) from classification learning of Type II
in Experiment 2
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interval, e.g. the two vertical lines in Fig. 22, as the difference
between the two points where the diagonal slope line
intersected the straight lines corresponding to initial, Iacc ,
and final, Facc, performance.
acc ¼ Iacc−Facc
1þ e bi−Bmidð Þdx
þ Facc ð1Þ
Slmid ¼ Facc−Iacc4  dx ð1bÞ
Appendix 4: Learning curves with sigmoid function fits for Type II feature inference learning
from Experiment 2
Fig. 23 Sigmoid functions fitted to learning curves for participants who showed any learning (in the error diagrams, Fig. 10) in the Type II feature
inference condition
Mem Cogn
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as
long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes weremade. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a
copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Anderson, A. L., Ross, B. H., & Chin-Parker, S. (2002). A further inves-
tigation of category learning by inference. Memory & Cognition,
30(1), 119-128.
Edmunds, C., & Wills, A. J. (2016). Modeling category learning using a
dual-system approach: A simulation of Shepard, Hovland and
Jenkins (1961) by COVIS. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting
of the Cognitive Science Society, 38(38), 69-74.
Gelman, S. A., & Markman, E. M. (1986). Categories and induction in
young children. Cognition, 23(3), 183-209.
Griffiths, T. L., Christian, B. R., & Kalish, M. L. (2008). Using category
structures to test iterated learning as a method for identifying induc-
tive biases. Cognitive Science, 32(1), 68-107.
Hoffmann, J., Denis, M., & Ziessler, M. (1983). Figurative features and
the construction of visual images. Psychological Research, 45(1),
39-54.
Johansen, M. K., & Kruschke, J. K. (2005). Category representation for
classification and feature inference. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(6), 1433-1458.
Johansen, M. K., Savage, J., Fouquet, N., & Shanks, D. R. (2015).
Salience Not Status: How Category Labels Influence Feature
Inference. Cognitive Science, 39(7), 1594-1621.
Kruschke, J. K. (1992). ALCOVE: an exemplar-based connectionist
model of category learning. Psychological Review, 99(1), 22-44.
Kurtz, K. J. (2007). The divergent autoencoder (DIVA) model of category
learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(4), 560-576.
Kurtz, K. J., Levering, K. R., Stanton, R. D., Romero, J., & Morris, S. N.
(2013). Human learning of elemental category structures: Revising
the classic result of Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
39(2), 552-572.
Lewandowsky, S. (2011). Working memory capacity and categorization:
individual differences and modeling. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(3), 720-738.
Love, B. C. (2002). Comparing supervised and unsupervised category
learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 829-835.
Love, B. C., Medin, D. L., & Gureckis, T. M. (2004). SUSTAIN: a
network model of category learning. Psychological Review, 111(2),
309-332.
Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory of classification
learning. Psychological Review, 85(3), 207-238.
Minda, J. P., Desroches, A. S., & Church, B. A. (2008). Learning rule-
described and non-rule-described categories: a comparison of chil-
dren and adults. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 34(6), 1518-1533.
Nosofsky, R. M., Gluck, M. A., Palmeri, T. J., McKinley, S. C., &
Glauthier, P. (1994a). Comparing modes of rule-based classification
learning: A replication and extension of Shepard, Hovland, and
Jenkins (1961). Memory & Cognition, 22(3), 352-369.
Nosofsky, R. M., & Palmeri, T. J. (1996). Learning to classify integral-
dimension stimuli. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(2), 222-226.
Nosofsky, R. M., Palmeri, T. J., & McKinley, S. C. (1994b). Rule-plus-
exception model of classification learning. Psychological Review,
101(1), 53-79.
Origin (Pro), Version 2017. OriginLab Corporation, Northampton, MA,
USA.
Palmeri, T. J. (1999). Learning categories at different hierarchical levels:
A comparison of category learning models. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review, 6(3), 495-503.
Rehder, B., & Hoffman, A. B. (2005). Eyetracking and selective attention
in category learning. Cognitive Psychology, 51(1), 1-41.
Shepard, R. N., Hovland, C. I., & Jenkins, H. M. (1961). Learning and
memorization of classifications. Psychological Monographs:
General and Applied, 75(13), 1-42.
Smith, J. D., Minda, J. P., & Washburn, D. A. (2004). Category learning
in rhesus monkeys: a study of the Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins
(1961) tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133(3),
398-414.
Yamauchi, T., & Markman, A. B. (1998). Category learning by inference
and classification. Journal of Memory and Language, 39(1), 124-
148.
Yamauchi, T., & Markman, A. B. (2000). Inference using categories.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 26(3), 776-795.
Žauhar, V., Bajšanski, I., & Domijan, D. (2014). Metacognitive
Monitoring of Rule-Based Category Learning Tasks. Proceedings
of the Trieste Symposium on Perception and Cognition, 162-165.
Žauhar, V., Bajšanski, I., & Domijan, D. (2016). Concurrent dynamics of
category learning and metacognitive judgments. Frontiers in
Psychology, 7, 1-11.
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdic-
tional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Mem Cogn
